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Abstract
Modern psychology is apparently in crisis and the prevailing view is that this partly reflects an inability to replicate
past findings. If a crisis does exists, then it is some kind of ‘chronic’ crisis, as psychologists have been censuring
themselves over replicability for decades. While the debate in psychology is not new, the lack of progress across
the decades is disappointing. Recently though, we have seen a veritable surfeit of debate alongside multiple
orchestrated and well-publicised replication initiatives. The spotlight is being shone on certain areas and although
not everyone agrees on how we should interpret the outcomes, the debate is happening and impassioned. The
issue of reproducibility occupies a central place in our whig history of psychology.
In the parlance of Karl Popper, the notion of falsification
is seductive – some seem to imagine that it identifies an
act as opposed to a process. It often carries the mislead-
ing implication that hypotheses can be readily discarded
in the face of something called a ‘failed’ replication.
Popper [46] was quite transparent when he declared “…a
few stray basic statements contradicting a theory will
hardly induce us to reject it as falsified. We shall take it
as falsified only if we discover a reproducible effect which
refutes the theory. In other words, we only accept the fal-
sification if a low level empirical hypothesis which de-
scribes such an effect is proposed and corroborated.”
(p.203: my italics). Popper’s view might reassure those
whose psychological models have recently come under
scrutiny through replication initiatives. We cannot, nor
should we, close the door on a hypothesis because a
study fails to be replicated. The hypothesis is not nulli-
fied and ‘nay-saying’ alone is an insufficient response
from scientists. Like Popper, we might expect a testable
alternative hypothesis that attempts to account for the
discrepancy across studies; and one that itself may be
subject to testing rather than merely being ad hoc. In
other words, a ‘failed’ replication is not, in itself, the an-
swer to a question, but a further question.
Replication, replication, replication
At least two key types of replication exist: direct and
conceptual. Conceptual replication generally refers to
cases where researchers ‘tweak’ the methods of previous
studies [43] and when successful, may be informative
with regard to the boundaries and possible moderators
of an effect. When a conceptual replication fails, how-
ever, fewer clear implications exist for the original study
because of likely differences in procedure or stimuli and
so on. For this reason, we have seen an increased weight
given to direct replications.
How often do direct and conceptual replications occur
in psychology? Screening 100 of the most-cited psych-
ology journals since 1900, Makel, Plucker & Hegarty [40]
found that approximately 1.6 % of all psychology articles
used the term replication in the text. A further more de-
tailed analysis of 500 randomly selected articles revealed
that only 68 % using the term replication were actual rep-
lications. They calculated an overall replication rate of
1.07 % and Makel et al. [40] found that only 18 % of those
were direct rather than conceptual replications.
The lack of replication in psychology is systemic and
widespread, and particularly the bias against publishing
direct replications. In their survey of social science jour-
nal editors, Neuliep & Crandall [42] found almost three
quarters preferred to publish novel findings rather than
replications. In a parallel survey of reviewers for social
science journals, Neuliep & Crandall [43] found over
half (54 %) stated a preference for new findings over rep-
lications. Indeed, reviewers stated that replications were
“Not newsworthy” or even a “Waste of space”. By contrast,
comments from natural science journal editors present a
more varied picture, with comments ranging from “Repli-
cation without some novelty is not accepted” to “Replica-
tion is rarely an issue for us…since we publish them.” [39].
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Despite an enduring historical abandonment of repli-
cation, the tide appears to be turning. Makel et al. [40]
found that the replication rate after the year 2000 was
1.84 times higher than for the period between 1950 and
1999. In a more recent evolution, several large-scale dir-
ect replication projects have emerged during the past
2 years including: the Many Labs project [33]; a set of
preregistered replications published in a special issue of
Social Psychology (Edited by [44]); the Reproducibility
Project of the Open Science Collaboration [45]; and the
Pipeline Project by Schweinsberg et al. [50]. In two of
these projects (Many Labs by [33]; Pipeline Project by
[50]), a group of researchers replicated samples of stud-
ies, with each group replicating all studies. In the two
remaining projects, a number of research groups each
replicated one study, selected from a sample of studies
(Registered Reports by [44]; Open Science Collaboration,
[45]). Each project ensured that replications were suffi-
ciently powered (typically in excess of 90 % -thus offer-
ing a very good probability of detecting true effects) and
where possible, used the original materials and stimuli
as provided by the original authors. It is worth consider-
ing each in more detail.
Many Labs involved 36 research groups across 12
countries who replicated 13 psychological studies in over
6,000 participants. Studies of classic and newer effects
were selected partly because they had simple designs
that could be adapted for online administration. Reassur-
ingly perhaps, 10 of the 13 effects replicated consistently
across 36 different samples with, of course, some vari-
ability in the effect size reported compared to the ori-
ginal studies – some smaller but also some larger. One
effect received weak support. Only two studies consist-
ently failed to replicate and both involved what are de-
scribed as ‘social priming’ phenomena. One study where
‘accidental’ exposure to a US flag resulted in increased
conservatism amongst Americans [11]. Participants
viewed four photos and were asked to just estimate the
time-of-day in the photo – the US flag appeared in two
photos. Following this, they completed an 8-item ques-
tionnaire assessing their views toward various political
issues (e.g., abortion, gun control). In the second prim-
ing study, exposure to ‘money’ had resulted in endorse-
ment of the current social system [12]. In this study,
participants completed demographic questions against a
background that showed a faint picture of US $100 bills
or the same background but blurred. Each of these two
priming experiments had a single significant p-value
(out of 36 replications) and for flag priming, it was in
the opposite direction to that expected.
Turning to the special issue of Social Psychology edited
by Nosek & Lakens [44]. This contained a series of articles
replicating important results in social psychology.
Important was broadly defined as “…often cited, a topic of
intense scholarly or public interest, a challenge to estab-
lished theories), but should also have uncertain truth value
(e.g., few confirmations, imprecise estimates of effect
sizes).” One might euphemistically describe the studies as
curios. The articles were first submitted as Registered
Reports and reviewed prior to data collection, with authors
being assured their findings would be published regardless
of outcome, as long as they adhered to the registered
protocol. Attempted replications included the “Romeo
and Juliet effect” – does parental interference lead to in-
creases in love and commitment (Original: [17]; Replica-
tion: Sinclair, Hood, & Wright, [53]), does experiencing
physical warmth (warm therapeutic packs) increase judg-
ments of interpersonal warmth (Original: [58]; Replica-
tion: Lynott, Corker, Wortman, Connell, Donnellan,
Lucas, & O’Brien, [38]), does recalling unethical behavior
lead participants to see the room as darker (Original: [3];
Replication: [10]); does physical cleanliness reduce the se-
verity of moral judgments (original : [49]: [28]). In contrast
to high replication rate of Many Labs, the Registered
Reports replications failed to confirm the results in 10 of
13 studies.
In the largest crowdsourced effort to date, the OSC Re-
producibility project involved 270 collaborators attempting
to replicate 100 findings from 3 major psychology journals
Psychological Science (PSCI), Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology (JPSP), and Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (JEP: LMC).
While 97 of 100 studies originally reported statistically sig-
nificant results, only 36 % of the replications did so with a
mean effect size of around half of that reported in the ori-
ginal studies.
All of the journals exhibited a large reduction of around
50 % in effect sizes, with replications from JPSP particularly
affected - shrinking by 75 % from 0.29 to 0.07. The replic-
ability in one domain of psychology (good or poor) in no
way guarantees what will happen in another domain. One
thing we know from this project, is that “…reproducibility
was stronger in studies and journals representing cognitive
psychology than social psychology topics. For example,
combining across journals, 14 of 55 (25 %) of social psych-
ology effects replicated by the P < 0.05 criterion, whereas 21
of 42 (50 %) of cognitive psychology effects did so.” The
reasons for such a difference are debatable, but provide no
licence to either congratulate cognitive psychologists or be-
rate social psychologists. Indeed, the authors paint a consid-
ered and faithful picture of what their findings mean when
they conclude “…how many of the effects have we estab-
lished are true? Zero. And how many of the effects have we
established are false? Zero. Is this a limitation of the project
design? No. It is the reality of doing science”. (Open Science
Collaboration p.4716-7)
The studies that were not selected for replication are
informative – they were described as “…deemed
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infeasible to replicate because of time, resources, instru-
mentation, dependence on historical events, or hard-to-
access samples… [and some] required specialized sam-
ples (such as macaques or people with autism), re-
sources (such as eye tracking machines or functional
magnetic resonance imaging), or knowledge making
them difficult to match with teams”. Thus, the main
drivers of replication are often economic in terms of
time, money and human investment. High cost studies
are likely to remain castles in the air, leaving us with lit-
tle insight about replicability rates in some areas such as
functional imaging (e.g. [9]), clinical and health psych-
ology (see Coyne, this issue), and neuropsychology.
The ‘Pipeline project’ by Schweinsberg et al. [50]
intentionally used a non-adversarial approach. They
crowdsourced 25 research teams across various countries
to replicate a series of 10 unpublished moral-judgment
experiments from the lead author’s (Uhlmann) lab i.e., in
the pipeline. This speaks directly to Lykken’s [37] pro-
posal from nearly 50 years ago that “…ideally all experi-
ments would be replicated before publication” although
at that time, he deemed it ‘impractical’.
Pipeline replications included: the Bigot–misanthrope
effect – whether participants judge a manager who
selectively mistreats racial minorities as a more blame-
worthy person than a manager who mistreats all of his
employees; Bad tipper effect - are people who leave a full
tip, but entirely in pennies judged more negatively than
someone who leaves less money, but in notes; the Burn-
in-hell effect – do people perceive corporate executives
as more likely to burn in hell than members of social
categories defined by antisocial behaviour, such as van-
dals. Six of ten findings replicated across all of their rep-
lication criteria, one further finding replicated but with a
significantly smaller effect size than the original, one
finding replicated consistently in the original culture but
not outside of it (bad tipper replicated in US and not
outside), and two findings effects were unsupported.
The headline replication rates differed considerably
across projects – occurring more frequently for Many
Labs (77 %) and the Pipeline Project (60 %) than Regis-
tered Reports (30 %) and the Open Science Collabor-
ation (36 %). Why are replication rates lower in the
latter two projects? Possible explanations include the
choice of likely versus unlikely replication candidates.
Amongst the Many Labs studies, some had already pre-
viously been replicated and were selected knowing this
fact. By contrast, the studies in the Pipeline project had
not been previously replicated (indeed, not even previ-
ously published). Also important from a different per-
spective is whether each study was replicated only once
by one group or multiple times by many groups.
In the Many Labs and Pipeline projects, 36 and 25
separate research groups were replicating each of 13 and
10 studies respectively. Multiple analyses lend them-
selves to meta-analytic techniques and analysis of the
heterogeneity across research groups examining the
same effect – the extent to which they accord in their ef-
fect sizes or not. The Many Labs project reported I2
values, which estimate the proportion of variation due to
heterogeneity rather than chance. In the majority of cases,
heterogeneity was small to moderate or even non-existent
(e.g. across the 36 replications for both of the social prim-
ing studies: flag and money). Indeed, heterogeneity of ef-
fect sizes was greater between studies than within studies.
When heterogeneity was greater, it was - perhaps surpris-
ingly - where mean effect sizes were largest. Nonetheless,
Many Labs reassuringly shows that some effects are highly
replicable across research groups, countries, presenta-
tional differences (online versus face to face).
Counter-intuitive and even fanciful psychological hy-
potheses are not necessarily more likely to be false, but be-
lieving them to be so may influence researchers– even
implicitly – in terms of how replications are conducted. In
their extensive literature search, Makel et al. [40] reported
that most direct replications are conducted by authors
who proposed the original findings. This raises the thorny
question of who should replicate? Almost 50 years ago Ba-
kan [2] sagely warned that “If an investigator attempts to
replicate his own investigation at another time, he will in-
evitably be under the influence of what he has already
done…He should challenge, for example, his personal
identification with the results he has already obtained, and
prepare himself for finding both novelty and contradiction
with respect to his earlier investigation” and that “…If one
investigator is interested in replicating the investigation of
another investigator, he should carefully take into account
the possibility of suggestion, or his willingness to accept
the results of the earlier investigator. …He should take
careful cognizance of possible motivation for showing the
earlier investigator to be in error, etc. [p. 110].” The irony
is that as psychologists, we should be acutely aware of
such biases - we cannot ignore the psychology of replica-
tion in the replication of psychology.
What are we replicating and why?
The cheap and easy
Few areas of psychology have fallen under the replication
lens and where they have, they are psychology’s equivalent
to take-away meals – easy to prepare studies (e.g. often
using online links to questionnaires). Hence, the focus has
tended to be on studies from social and cognitive psych-
ology, and not for example developmental or clinical stud-
ies, which are more prohibitive. Other notable examples
exist such as cognitive neuropsychology, where the single
case study has been predominant for decades – how can
anyone recreate the brain injury and subsequent cognitive
testing in a second patient?
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The contentious
We cannot assert that the totality– or even a represen-
tative sample - of psychology has been scrutinised for
replication. We can also see why some may feel tar-
geted– replication does not (and probably cannot) occur
in a random fashion. The vast majority of psychological
studies are overlooked. To date, psychologists have tar-
geted the unexpected, the curious, and newsworthy
findings; and largely within a narrow range of areas
(cognitive and social primarily). As psychologists, the
need to sample more widely ought to go without saying;
and one corollary of this, is that it makes no sense to
claim that psychology is in crisis.
Too often perhaps, psychologists have been attracted
to replicating contentious topics such as social priming,
ego-depletion, psychic ability and so on. Some high
impact journals have become repositories for the
attention-grabbing, strange, unexpected and unbeliev-
able findings. This goes to the systemic heart of the mat-
ter. Hartshorne & Schachner [27] amongst many others
have noted “…replicability is not systematically consid-
ered in measuring paper, researcher, and journal quality.
As a result, the current incentive structure rewards the
publication of non-replicable findings…” (p.3 my italics).
This is nothing new in science, as the quest for scientific
prestige has historically resulted in a conflict between
the goals of science and the personal goals of the scien-
tist (see [47]).
The preposterous
“If there is no ESP, then we want to be able to carry
out null experiments and get no effect, otherwise we
cannot put much belief in work on small effects in
non-ESP situations. If there is ESP, that is exciting.
However, thus far it does not look as if it will replace
the telephone” (Mosteller [41], p 396)
From the opposite perspective, Jim Coyne (this issue)
maintains that psychology would benefit from some “…
provision for screening out candidates for replication for
which a consensus could be reached that the research
hypotheses were improbable and not warranting the ef-
fort and resources required for a replication to establish
this.” The frustration of some psychologists is palpable
as they peruse apparently improbable hypotheses. Coy-
ne’s concern echoes that of Edwards [18] who half a cen-
tury ago similarly remarked, “If a hypothesis is
preposterous to start with, no amount of bias against it
can be too great. On the other hand, if it is preposterous
to start with, why test it?” Edwards (p 402). How prepos-
terous can we get? According to Simmons et al. [51], it
is “…unacceptably easy to publish “statistically signifi-
cant” evidence consistent with any hypothesis. (p. 1359).
Indeed, they managed to show by manipulating what
they describe as researcher degrees of freedom (e.g. ‘data-
peeking’, deciding when to stop testing participants,
whether to exclude outlying data points), that people ap-
pear to forget their age and claim to be 1.5 years youn-
ger after listening to the Beatles song “When I’m 64”.
The fact that seemingly incredible findings can be pub-
lished raises disquiet about the methods normally
employed by psychologists and in some circles, this has in-
flated to concerns about psychology more generally. Within
the methodological and statistical frameworks that psychol-
ogists normally operate, we have to face the unpalatable
possibility that the wriggle room for researchers is – un-
acceptably large. Further, it is implicitly reinforced, as
Coyne notes, by the actions of some journals as well as
media outlets– and until that is adequately addressed, little
will change.
The negative
Interestingly, the four replication projects outlined above
almost wholly neglected null findings. To date, replica-
tion efforts are invariably aimed at positive findings.
Should we not also try to replicate null findings? Given
the propensity for positive findings to become nulls,
what is the likelihood of reverse effects in more ad-
equately powered studies? The emphasis on replicating
positive outcomes betrays the wider bias that psycholo-
gist have against null findings per se (Laws [36]). The
overwhelming majority of published findings in psych-
ology are positive (93.5 %: [54]) and the aversion to null
findings may well be worse in psychology than other sci-
ences [20]. Intriguingly, we can see a hint of this issue
inthe OSC reproducibility project, which did include 3
%of sampled findings that were null initially - and whi-
letwo were confirmed as nulls, one did indeed become
significant.As psychologists, we might ponder how the
biasagainst publishing null findings finds a clear echo in
the bias against replicating null findings.
A conflict between belief and evidence
The wriggle room is fertile ground for psychologists to
exploit the disjunction between belief and evidence that
seems quite pervasive in psychology. As remarked upon
by Francis “Contrary to its central role in other science-
s,it appears that successful replication is sometimes not
related to belief about an effect in experimental psych-
ology. A high rate of successful replication is not suffi-
cient to induce belief in an effect [8], nor is a high rate of
successful replication necessary for belief [22].” The Bem
[8] study documented “experimental evidence for anom-
alous retroactive influences on cognition and affect” or
in plain language…precognition. Using multiple tasks,
and nine experiments involving over 1,000 participants,
Bem had implausibly demonstrated that the performance
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of participants reflected what happened after they had
made their decision. For example, on a memory test,
participants were more likely to remember words that
they were later asked to practise i.e. memory rehearsal
seemingly worked back in time. In another task, partici-
pants had to select which of two curtains on a computer
screen hid an erotic image, and they did so at a level sig-
nificantly greater than chance, but not when the hidden
images were less titillating. Furthermore, Bem and col-
leagues [7] later meta-analysed 90 previous studies to es-
tablish a significant effect size of 0.22.
Bem presents nine replications of a phenomenon and a
large meta-analysis, yet we do not believe it, while other
phenomena do not so readily replicate (e.g. bystander ap-
athy [22]) but we do believe in them. Francis [23] bleakly
concludes “The scientific method is supposed to be able to
reveal truths about the world, and the reliability of empir-
ical findings is supposed to be the final arbiter of science;
but this method does not seem to work in experimental
psychology as it is currently practiced.” Whether we be-
lieve in Bem’s precognition, social priming, or indeed, any
published psychological finding – researchers are operat-
ing within the methodological and statistical wriggle room.
The task for psychologists is to view these phenomena like
any other scientific question i.e. in need of explanation. If
they can close-down the wriggle room, then we might ex-
pect such curios and anomalies to evaporate in a cloud of
nonsignificant results.
While some might view the disjunction between belief
and evidence as ‘healthy skepticism’, others might also de-
scribe it as resistance to evidence or even anti-science. A
pertinent example comes from Lykken [37] who described
a study in which people who see frogs in a Rorschach test
– ‘frog responders’ – were more likely to have an eating
disorder [48] – a finding interpreted as evidence of har-
boring oral impregnation fantasies and an unconscious
belief in anal birth. Lykken asked 20 clinician colleagues
to estimate the likelihood of this ‘cloacal theory of birth’
before and after seeing Sapolsky’s evidence. Beforehand,
they reported a “…median value of 0.01, which can be
interpreted to mean, roughly, ‘I don't believe it’” and after
being shown the confirmatory evidence “…the median
unchanged at 0.01. I interpret this consensus to mean,
roughly, ‘I still don’t believe it.’” (p. 151–152). Lykken
remarked that normally when a prediction is confirmed
by experiment, we might expect “…a nontrivial increment
in one’s confidence in that theory should result, especially
when one’s prior confidence is low… [but that] this rule is
wrong not only in a few exceptional instances but as it is
routinely applied to the majority of experimental reports
in the psychological literature” p.152. Often such claims
give rise to a version of Feynman’s maxim that “Extraor-
dinary claims require extraordinary evidence”. The
remarkableness of a claim, however, is not necessarily
relevant to either the type or the scale of evidence required.
Instead of setting different criteria for the ordinary and
extraordinary, we need to continue to close the wriggle
room.
Beliefs and the failure to self-correct
“Scientists should not be in the business of simply
ignoring literature that they do not like because it
contests their view.” [30]
Taking this to the opposite extreme, some researchers
may choose to ignore the findings of meta-analyses at the
expense of selected individual studies that accord more
with their view. Giner-Sorolla [24] maintained that “…
meta-analytic validation is not seen as necessary to pro-
claim an effect reliable. Textbooks, press reports, and
narrative reviews often rest conclusions on single influ-
ential articles rather than insisting on a replication
across independent labs and multiple contexts” (p 564,
my italics).
Stoebe & Strack rightly point-out, “Even multiple fail-
ures to replicate an established finding would not result in
a rejection of the original hypothesis, if there are also mul-
tiple studies that supported that hypothesis.” [and] ‘be-
lievers’ “…will keep on believing, pointing at the
successful replications and derogating the unsuccessful
ones, whereas the nonbelievers will maintain their belief
system drawing on the failed replications for support of
their rejection of the original hypothesis.” (p.64). Psych-
ology rarely – if ever- proceeds with an unequivocal
knock-out blow delivered by a negative finding or even a
meta-analysis. Indeed, psychology often has more of the
feel of trench warfare, where models and hypotheses are
ultimately abandoned largely because researchers lose
interest [26].
Jussim et al. [30] provide some interesting examples of
precisely how social psychology doesn’t seem to correct
itself when big findings fail to replicate. If doubts are
raised about an original finding then as Jussim et al
point out, we might expect citations to reflect this de-
bate, the uncertainly and as such the original and the
unsuccessful replications would be expected to be fairly
equally cited.
In a classic study, Darley & Gross [15] found people ap-
plied a stereotype about social class when they saw a
young girl taking a maths test either after seeing her play-
ing in an affluent or poor background. After obtaining the
original materials and following the procedure carefully,
Baron et al. [6] published two failed replications using
more than twice as many participants. Not only did they
fail to replicate, the evidence was in the opposite direction.
Such findings ought to encourage debate with relatively
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equal attention to the pro and con studies in the literature
- alas no. Jussim et al. reported that “…since 1996, the ori-
ginal study has been cited 852 times, while the failed repli-
cations have been cited just 38 times (according to Google
Scholar searches conducted on 9/11/15).”
This is not an unusual case, as Jussim et al. report sev-
eral examples of failed replications not being cited, while
original studies continue to be readily cited. The infam-
ous and seminal study by Bargh and colleagues [5]
showed that unconsciously priming people with an ‘eld-
erly stereotype’ (unscrambling jumbled sentences that
contained words like: old, lonely, bingo, wrinkle) makes
them subsequently walk more slowly. However, Doyen
et al. [16] failed to replicate the finding using more
accurate measures of walking speed. Since 2013, Bargh
et al. has been cited 900 times and Doyen et al. 192. Or
a meta-analysis of 88 studies by Jost et al. [29] showing
that conservativism is a syndrome characterized by ri-
gidity, dogmatism, prejudice, and fear, not replicated by
a larger better controlled meta-analysis conducted by
Van Hiel and colleagues [57]. Since 2010, the former has
been cited 1030 times while the latter a mere 60 by com-
parison. Jussim et al. suggest “This pattern of ignoring
correctives likely leads social psychology to overstate the
extent to which evidence supports the original study’s
conclusions…[] it behooves researchers to grapple with
the full literature, not just the studies conducive to their
preferred arguments”.
Meta-analysis: rescue remedy or statistical alchemy?
Some view meta-analysis as the closest thing we have to
a definitive approach for establishing the veracity and re-
liability of an effect. In the context of discussing social
priming experiments, John Bargh [4] declared that “…In
science the way to answer questions about replicability of
effects is through statistical techniques such as meta-
analysis”. Others are more skeptical: “Meta-analysis is a
reasonable way to search for patterns in previously pub-
lished research. It has serious limitations, however, as a
method for confirming hypotheses and for establishing
the replicability of experiments” (p. 486 Hyman, 2010).
Meta-analysis is not a magic dust that we can sprinkle
over primary literatures to elucidate necessary truths.
Likewise totemically accumulating replicated findings, in
itself, does not necessarily prove anything (pace Popper).
Does it matter if we replicate a finding once, twice, or 20
times, what ratio of positive to negative outcomes do we
find acceptable? Answers or rules of thumb do not exist
– it often comes down to our beliefs in psychology.
This special issue of BMC Psychology contains 4 articles
(Taylor & Munafo, [56]; Lakens, Hilgaard & Staaks [34];
Coppens, Verkoeijen, Bouwmeester & Rikers, [13]; Coyne
[14]) and in each, meta-analysis occupies a pivotal place.
As shown by Taylor & Munafo (current issue), meta
analyses have proliferated, are highly cited and “…most
worryingly, the perceived authority of the conclusions of a
meta-analysis means that it has become possible to use a
meta-analysis in the hope of having the final word in an
academic debate.” As with all methods, meta-analysis has
its own limitations and retrospective validation via meta-
analysis is not a substitute for prospective replication using
adequately powered trials, but they do have substantive
role to play in the reproducibility question.
Judging the weight of evidence is never straightforward
and whether a finding sustains in psychology often reflect
our beliefs almost as much as the evidence. Indeed, meta-
analysis rightly or wrongly enables some ideas to persist des-
pite a lack of support at the level of individual study or trial.
This has certainly been argued in the use of meta-analyses
to establish a case for psychic abilities, where Storm, Tres-
soldi & Di Risio [55] identify how “It distorts what scientists
mean by confirmatory evidence. It confuses retrospective
sanctification with prospective replicability.” (p.489)
This is a kind of free-lunch’ notion of meta-analysis.
Feinstein [21] even stated that “meta-analysis is analogous
to statistical alchemy for the 21st century…the main ap-
peal is that it can convert existing things into something
better. “Significance” can be attained statistically when
small group sizes are pooled into big ones” (p. 71). Un-
doubtedly, the conclusions of meta-analyses may prove
unreliable where small numbers of nonsignificant trials
are pooled to produce significant effects [19]. Nonetheless,
it is also quite feasible for a majority of negative outcomes
in a literature and still produce a reliable overall significant
effect size (e.g. streptokinase: [35]).
Two of the papers presented here (Lakens et al. this
issue; Taylor & Munafo this issue) offer extremely good
suggestions relating to some of these conflicts in meta-
analytic findings. Lakens and colleagues offer 6 recom-
mendations, including permitting others to “re-analyze
the data to examine how sensitive the results are to sub-
jective choices such as inclusion criteria” and enabling
this by providing links to data files that permit such ana-
lysis. Currently, we also need to address data sharing in
regular papers. Sampling papers published in one year in
the top 50 high-impact journals, Alsheikh-Ali et al. [1]
reported that a substantial proportion of papers pub-
lished in high-impact journals “…are either not subject
to any data availability policies, or do not adhere to the
data availability instructions in their respective journals”.
Such efforts for transparency are extremely welcome
and indeed, echo the posting online of our interactive
CBT for schizophrenia meta-analysis database (http://
www.cbtinschizophrenia.com/), which has been used by
others to test new hypotheses (e.g. [25]).
Taylor & Munafo (this issue) advise greater triangula-
tion of evidence and in this particular instance, supple-
menting traditional meta-analysis and P-curve analysis
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[52]. In passing, Taylor & Munafo also mention “…ad-
versarial collaboration, where primary study authors on
both sides of a particular debate contribute to an
agreed protocol and work together to interpret the re-
sults”. The proposed version of adversarial collabor-
ation proposed by Kahneman [31] urged scientists to
engage in a “good-faith effort to conduct debates by
carrying out joint research” (p. 729). More recently, he
elaborated on this in the context of the furore over
failed replications (Kahneman [32]). Coyne covers some
aspects of this latest paper on replication etiquette and
finds some of it wanting. It may however be possible to
find some new adversarial middle ground, but it crucially
depends upon psychologists being more open. Indeed,
some aspects of adversarial collaboration could dovetail
with Lakens et als’ proposal regarding hosting relevant
data on web platforms. In such a scenario, opposing
views could test their hypotheses in a public arena using a
shared database.
In the context of adversarial collaboration, some un-
certainty and difference of opinion exists about how we
might accommodate the views of those being replicated.
One possibility again requires openness and that is for
those who are replicated to be asked to submit a review;
and crucially, the review and replicator’s responses are
then published alongside the paper. Indeed, this hap-
pened with the paper of Coppens et al. (this issue). They
replicated the ‘testing effect’ reported by Carpenter
(2009) – that information which has been retrieved from
memory is better recalled than that which has simply
been studied. Their replications and meta-analysis par-
tially replicate the original findings, and Carpenter was
one of the reviewers whose review is available alongside
the paper (along with the author responses). Indeed,
from its initiation, BMC Psychology has published all re-
views and responses to reviewers alongside published
papers. This degree of openness is unusual in psychology
journals, but does offer readers a glimpse into the
process behind a replication (or any paper), allows the
person being replicated to contribute and comment on
the replication, to reply and be published in the same
journal at the same time.
Ultimately, the issues that psychologists face over repli-
cation are as much about our beliefs, biases and openness
as anything else. We are not dispassionate about the out-
comes that we measure. Maybe because the substance of
our spotlight is people, cognition and brains, we some-
times care too much about the ‘truths’ we choose to de-
clare. They have implications. Similarly, we should not
ignore the incentive structures and conflicts between the
personal goals of psychologists and the goals of science.
They have implications. Finally, the attitudes of psycholo-
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